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COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COMMUNITY COLLEGE, * 
* BRIEF OF RESPONDENT INDUSTRIAL 
Petitioner, * COMMISSION OF UTAH 
* 
* APPELLATE CASE NO: 930374-CA 
VS. * 
* 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF * PRIORITY NO. 7 
UTAH, and PAUL T. KIRBY, * 
Respondents. * 
PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(a), Utah Code Ann. §34-35-7.1(12) 
and Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(1) grant the Utah Court of Appeals 
jurisdiction over this Petition For Review. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Salt Lake Community College has raised three arguments in its 
Petition For Review. Respondent Kirby has replied to the second 
and third of those arguments in his brief. Respondent Industrial 
Commission will reply to the College's first argument—that the 
Anti-Discrimination Division's Order of January 22, 1993 is 
invalid. The Court has plenary authority over this purely legal 
issue. Silva v. Department of Employment Security, 786 P.2d 246, 
247 (Utah App. 1990). 
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APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF STATUTE AND RULE 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann, S34-35-3 
The commission shall have jurisdiction over the subject 
of employment practices and discrimination made unlawful 
by this chapter. There is hereby created a division of 
the commission to be known and designated as the Utah 
Antidiscrimination Division, which division shall be 
under the jurisdiction and direction of the commission. 
The division shall have as its immediate supervisory head 
a co-ordinator of fair employment practices. Such 
co-ordinator shall be appointed by the commission. Any 
co-ordinator so appointed shall at all times be under the 
direct supervision and control of the commission. 
Utah Code Ann. S34-35-4 
The antidiscrimination division shall consist of three 
members who shall be members of the commission. The 
commission may adopt, amend or rescind rules for 
governing its meetings, and two commissioners shall 
constitute a quorum. 
Utah Code Ann. S34-35-5 
(1) The Utah Antidiscrimination Division may: 
(a) appoint and prescribe the duties of 
investigators and other employees and agents that it 
considers necessary for the enforcement of this chapter; 
(b) adopt, publish, amend, and rescind rules, 
consistent with, and for the enforcement of, this 
chapter; 
Utah Code Ann. S34-35-7.1 
(1) (a) Any person claiming to be aggrieved by a 
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice may by 
himself, his attorney, or his agent, make, sign, and file 
with the commission a request for agency action. 
(b) Every request for agency action shall be 
verified under oath or affirmation. 
(c) A request for agency action made under this 
section shall be filed within 180 days after the alleged 
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice 
occurred. 
(2) Any employer, labor organization, joint 
apprenticeship committee, or vocational school who has 
employees or members who refuse or threaten to refuse to 
comply with the provisions of this chapter may file with 
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the commission a request for agency action asking the 
commission for assistance to obtain their compliance by 
conciliation or other remedial action. 
(3) (a) Before a hearing is set or held as part of any 
adjudicative proceeding, the commission shall promptly 
assign an investigator to attempt a settlement between 
the parties by conference, conciliation, or persuasion. 
(b) If no settlement is reached, the investigator shall 
make a prompt impartial investigation of all allegations 
made in the request for agency action. 
(c) The commission and its staff, agents, and employees 
shall conduct every investigation in fairness to all 
parties and agencies involved, and may not attempt a 
settlement between the parties if it is clear that no 
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice has 
occurred. 
(d) If the aggrieved party wishes to withdraw the request 
for agency action, he must do so prior to the issuance of 
a final order. 
(4) (a) If the initial attempts at settlement are 
unsuccessful, and the investigator uncovers insufficient 
evidence during his investigation to support the 
allegations of a discriminatory or prohibited employment 
practice set out in the request for agency action, the 
investigator shall formally report these findings to the 
director. 
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's report, the 
director may issue a determination and order for 
dismissal of the adjudicative proceeding. 
(c) A party may make a written request to the 
director for an evidentiary hearing to review de novo the 
director's determination and order within 3 0 days of the 
date of the determination and order for dismissal. 
(d) If the director receives no timely request for 
a hearing, the determination and order issued by the 
director becomes the final order of the commission. 
(5) (a) If the initial attempts at settlement are 
unsuccessful and the investigator uncovers sufficient 
evidence during his investigation to support the 
allegations of a discriminatory or prohibited employment 
practice set out in the request for agency action, the 
investigator shall formally report these findings to the 
director. 
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's report the 
director may issue a determination and order based on the 
investigator's report. 
(c) A party may file a written request to the 
director for an evidentiary hearing to review de novo the 
director's determination and order within 30 days of the 
date of the determination and order. 
(d) If the director receives no timely request for 
a hearing, the determination and order issued by the 
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director requiring the respondent to cease any 
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice and to 
provide relief to the aggrieved party becomes the final 
order of the commission. 
(6) In any adjudicative proceeding, the investigator who 
investigated the matter may not participate in a hearing 
except as a witness, nor may he participate in the 
deliberations of the presiding officer. 
(7) Prior to commencement of an evidentiary hearing, the 
party filing the request for agency action may reasonably 
and fairly amend any allegation, and the respondent may 
amend its answer. Those amendments may be made during or 
after a hearing but only with permission of the presiding 
officer. 
(8) (a) If, upon all the evidence at a hearing, the 
presiding officer finds that a respondent has not engaged 
in a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice, 
the presiding officer shall issue an order dismissing the 
request for agency action containing the allegation of a 
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice. 
(b) The presiding officer may order that the 
respondent be reimbursed by the complaining party for his 
attorneys/ fees and costs. 
(9) If upon all the evidence at the hearing, the 
presiding officer finds that a respondent has engaged in 
a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice, the 
presiding officer shall issue an order requiring the 
respondent to cease any discriminatory or prohibited 
employment practice and to provide relief to the 
complaining party, including reinstatement, back pay and 
benefits, and attorneys' fees and costs. 
(10) Conciliation between the parties is to be urged and 
facilitated at all stages of the adjudicative process. 
(11) (a) Either party may file a written request for 
review of the order issued by the presiding officer in 
accordance with Section 63-46b-12. 
(b) If there is no timely request for review the 
order issued by the presiding officer becomes the final 
order of the commission. 
(12) An order of the commission under Subsection (11)(a) 
is subject to judicial review as provided in Section 
63-46b-16. 
(13) The commission shall have authority to make rules 
concerning procedures under this chapter in accordance 
with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative 
Rulemaking Act. 
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RULES 
Anti-Discrimination Rules—Utah Administrative Code R560-1-3.G. 
For those procedures specified in Section 34-35-7.1(1)-
(5), U.C.A., the presiding officer shall be the Director 
or the Director's designee. The presiding officer for 
the formal hearing referred to in Section 34-35-7>l(6)-
(11), U.C.A., shall be appointed by the Commission. 
NATURE OF THE CASE, PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION 
AND STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For purposes of the issue addressed by this brief, the 
College's statement of the case is adequate. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The College argues that the Anti-Discrimination 
Division's determination, which determination is the basis for this 
proceeding, is invalid. The College's argument fails to properly 
consider the provisions of Utah's Anti-Discrimination Act. 
Furthermore, because the College did not raise the validity of the 
Division's determination during the administrative proceeding 
before the Commission, it cannot raise the issue now, for the first 
time on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION DIVISION'S DETERMINATION IS 
VALID. 
Whether the Anti-Discrimination Division's determination is 
valid must be judged in the context of the entire administrative 
procedure established by the Anti-Discrimination Act. For that 
reason, a summary of the administrative procedure is set forth 
below. 
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The Utah Anti-Discrimination Act (Utah Code Ann. §34-35-1 et 
seq.) creates Utah's "Anti-Discrimination Division" which is 
comprised of the three members of the Industrial Commission of 
Utah. Utah Code Ann. §34-35-4. The Commission, as Utah's Anti-
Discrimination Division, has jurisdiction over unlawful employment 
practices. Utah Code Ann. §34-35-3. 
The Anti-Discrimination Act grants the Commission specific 
authority to: 
(a) appoint and prescribe the duties of investigators 
and other employees and agents that it considers 
necessary for the enforcement of this chapter; 
(b) adopt, publish, amend, rescind rules, consistent 
with, and for the enforcement of this chapter. Utah Code 
Ann. §34-35-5 
While the Anti-Discrimination Act designates the Industrial 
Commission as Utah's Anti-Discrimination Division, the Act creates 
an administrative agency also known as the "Anti-Discrimination 
Division". The Division is under the jurisdiction and direction of 
the Commission. Utah Code Ann. §34-35-3 The Act also provides for 
a "director" of the Anti-Discrimination Division. Utah Code Ann. 
§34-35-3 The Director is answerable to the Commission: 
The division shall have as its immediate supervisory head 
a co-ordinator of fair employment practices. Such co-
ordinator shall be appointed by the commission. Any co-
ordinator shall at all times be under the direct 
supervision and control of the commission, (emphasis 
added) Utah Code Ann. §34-35-3. 
In addition to creating the foregoing administrative apparatus 
for enforcing the provisions of the Anti-Discrimination Act, the 
Act also establishes the following procedure for investigation and 
adjudication of discrimination complaints: 
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1) Any person may file a discrimination complaint with the 
Commission. Utah Code Ann. 34-35-7.1(1)(a) 
2) After a discrimination complaint is filed, the Commission 
must assign an investigator to attempt settlement of the complaint. 
Utah Code Ann. §34-35-7.1(3) 
3) If settlement is unsuccessful, an investigator 
investigates the circumstances of the complaint and reports the 
results of his or her investigation to the Director. Utah Code 
Ann. §34-35-7.1(4) and (5) 
4) Upon receipt of the investigator's report, the director 
may issue a determination and order based on the investigator's 
findings. Utah Code Ann. §34-35-7.1(5)(b) 
5) A party aggrieved by the Director's determination may 
request a de novo evidentiary hearing before an Administrative Law 
Judge. The ALJ then issues an order, with no deference to the 
Division's earlier determination. Utah Code Ann. §34-35-7.1(8) and 
(9) 
6) A party aggrieved by the ALJ's decision may file a motion 
for review of that decision with the Commission itself. The 
Commission is not bound by the determination of the Division or 
ALJ, and may affirm, reverse or modify the ALJ's decision as it 
sees fit in the light of the evidence and law. Utah Code Ann. §34-
35-7.1(11) 
7) The Commission's order is subject to appellate review 
under §63-46b-16 of Utah's Administrative Procedures Act. Utah 
Code Ann. §34-35-7.1(12) 
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The foregoing statutory steps are set forth in some detail to 
address some of the misapprehensions raised in the College's brief. 
When the College's argument is viewed in the context of the entire 
procedure established by the Anti-Discrimination Act, certain 
important points stand out. 
First, the Industrial Commission itself, serving as Utah's 
Anti-Discrimination Division, has full authority to order and 
oversee the activities of the Anti-Discrimination Division. While 
the Anti-Discrimination Act uses the Anti-Discrimination Division 
for investigation and screening, final administrative 
responsibility remains with the Commission, and not with the 
Director. 
Second, the Division Director's role in adjudication of 
discrimination complaints is limited. The Director is involved 
only at the early "screening" stages of the administrative process. 
The Director's discretion is also limited. The Anti-Discrimination 
Act directs the Director to issue her determination "based on the 
investigator's report". Thus, the Director's personal involvement 
is not essential to the adjudication of a discrimination complaint. 
Third, the Anti-Discrimination Act has established an 
administrative procedure that provides ample opportunity to correct 
any error made in the Anti-Discrimination Division's determination. 
Simply by asking for a hearing, an aggrieved party obtains a de 
novo evidentiary proceeding. Once an evidentiary hearing is 
requested, the Division's determination is of no further operative 
effect. Consequently, the College was not prejudiced by any 
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alleged error made in the Division's informal determination, since 
any such error could easily be corrected at an evidentiary hearing. 
Fourth and finally, the Commission has exercised its authority 
to appoint subordinates and promulgate rules in such a way as to 
resolve the very argument raised by the College. The Commission's 
Rule R560-1-3.G provides: 
For those procedures specified in Section 34-35-7.1(1)-
(5), U.C.A., the presiding officer shall be the Director 
or the Director's designee. (emphasis added) 
Thus, as needed, the Director can allow a designee to fulfill her 
functions. 
In this case, the Director deemed it necessary to recuse 
herself from this case due to her associations in the recent past 
with the defendant. While it is true that the reasons for the 
Director's recusal have been submitted by affidavit for the first 
time on appeal, that is simply due to the fact that the College did 
not raise the validity of the Division's determination during the 
earlier proceedings. The Commission cannot be expected to respond 
to an argument until that argument is raised. 
In summary, the Division Director's delegation of her 
functions in this case was proper under the provisions of the Anti-
Discrimination Act and the associated rules adopted by the 
Commission. 
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POINT TWO 
HAVING FAILED TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF THE VALIDITY OF THE 
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION DIVISIONS ORDER BEFORE THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, THE COLLEGE CANNOT RAISE THAT 
ISSUE ON APPEAL. 
Utah's appellate courts have consistently held that issues 
that could have been raised before an administrative agency, but 
were not, cannot later be raised for the first time on appeal, 
Alvin G. Rhoades Pump Sales v. Industrial Commission, 681 P.2d 
1244, 1249 (Utah 1984); Rekward v. Industrial Commission, 755 P.2d 
166 (Utah App. 1988) 
The College did not challenge the validity of the Anti-
Discrimination Division's Order at any time during the proceedings 
before the Commission. Recognizing that its failure to raise the 
issue is fatal to its attack on the validity of the Order, the 
College attempts to frame the issue as one of "jurisdiction". 
In United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, 344 U.S. 33, 73 
S.Ct 67, 68 (1952) the United States Supreme Court dealt with a 
similar issue, arising from a challenge to an order of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission, based upon the improper appointment 
of a hearing examiner, which challenge was raised for the first 
time on appeal. Writing for the majority, Justice Jackson stated: 
Appellee did not offer nor did the (lower) court require 
any excuse for its failure to raise the objection upon at 
least one of its many opportunities during the 
administrative proceeding . . . . 
The apparent reason for complacency was that it was not 
actually prejudiced by the content or manner of 
appointment of the examiner. . . . The issue is clearly 
an afterthought, brought forward at the last possible 
moment to undo the administrative proceedings without 
consideration of the merits and can prevail only from 
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technical compulsion irrespective of considerations of 
practical justice. 
(We) hold that the defect in the examiner's 
appointment was an irregularity which would invalidate a 
resulting order if the Commission had overruled an 
appropriate objection made during the hearing. But it is 
not one which deprives the Commission of power or 
jurisdiction, so that even in the absence of timely 
objection the order should be set aside as a nullity. 
In citing the foregoing opinion, the Commission in no way 
concedes that, in the case before the Court, the Director's recusal 
and delegation of her function to another was irregular or 
improper. Rather, the opinion is cited for the proposition that 
even if an irregularity occurred, it is not jurisdictional in 
nature and must be raised during the administrative proceedings in 
order to be preserved for consideration on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should disregard the College's challenge to the 
validity of the Anti-Discrimination Division's determination, since 
that issue was raised for the first time on appeal. Alternatively, 
if the Court concludes it is proper to consider that issue, the 
Court should conclude that the Division's determination is valid, 
DATED this 1st day of April, 1994. 
By 
Alan Hennebold, General Counsel 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
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COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COMMUNITY COLLEGE, * 
* BRIEF OF RESPONDENT INDUSTRIAL 
Petitioner, * COMMISSION OF UTAH 
* 
* APPELLATE CASE NO: 930374-CA 
VS. * 
* 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF * PRIORITY NO. 7 
UTAH, and PAUL T. KIRBY, * 
* 
Respondents. * 
* 
PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(a), Utah Code Ann- §34-35-7.1(12) 
and Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(1) grant the Utah Court of Appeals 
jurisdiction over this Petition For Review. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Salt Lake Community College has raised three arguments in its 
Petition For Review. Respondent Kirby has replied to the second 
and third of those arguments in his brief. Respondent Industrial 
Commission will reply to the College's first argument—that the 
Anti-Discrimination Divisions Order of January 22, 1993 is 
invalid. The Court has plenary authority over this purely legal 
issue. Silva v. Department of Employment Security, 786 P.2d 246# 
247 (Utah App. 1990). 
1 
APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF STATUTE AND RULE 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann, S34-35-3 
The commission shall have jurisdiction over the subject 
of employment practices and discrimination made unlawful 
by this chapter. There is hereby created a division of 
the commission to be known and designated as the Utah 
Antidiscrimination Division, which division shall be 
under the jurisdiction and direction of the commission. 
The division shall have as its immediate supervisory head 
a co-ordinator of fair employment practices. Such 
co-ordinator shall be appointed by the commission. Any 
co-ordinator so appointed shall at all times be under the 
direct supervision and control of the commission. 
Utah Code Ann. S34-35-4 
The antidiscrimination division shall consist of three 
members who shall be members of the commission. The 
commission may adopt, amend or rescind rules for 
governing its meetings, and two commissioners shall 
constitute a quorum. 
Utah Code Ann. S34-35-5 
(1) The Utah Antidiscrimination Division may: 
(a) appoint and prescribe the duties of 
investigators and other employees and agents that it 
considers necessary for the enforcement of this chapter; 
(b) adopt, publish, amend, and rescind rules, 
consistent with, and for the enforcement of, this 
chapter; 
Utah Code Ann. 534-35-7.1 
(1) (a) Any person claiming to be aggrieved by a 
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice may by 
himself, his attorney, or his agent, make, sign, and file 
with the commission a request for agency action. 
(b) Every request for agency action shall be 
verified under oath or affirmation. 
(c) A request for agency action made under this 
section shall be filed within 180 days after the alleged 
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice 
occurred. 
(2) Any employer, labor organization, joint 
apprenticeship committee, or vocational school who has 
employees or members who refuse or threaten to refuse to 
comply with the provisions of this chapter may file with 
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the commission a request for agency action asking the 
commission for assistance to obtain their compliance by 
conciliation or other remedial action. 
(3) (a) Before a hearing is set or held as part of any 
adjudicative proceeding, the commission shall promptly 
assign an investigator to attempt a settlement between 
the parties by conference, conciliation, or persuasion. 
(b) If no settlement is reached, the investigator shall 
make a prompt impartial investigation of all allegations 
made in the request for agency action. 
(c) The commission and its staff, agents, and employees 
shall conduct every investigation in fairness to all 
parties and agencies involved, and may not attempt a 
settlement between the parties if it is clear that no 
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice has 
occurred. 
(d) If the aggrieved party wishes to withdraw the request 
for agency action, he must do so prior to the issuance of 
a final order. 
(4) (a) If the initial attempts at settlement are 
unsuccessful, and the investigator uncovers insufficient 
evidence during his investigation to support the 
allegations of a discriminatory or prohibited employment 
practice set out in the request for agency action, the 
investigator shall formally report these findings to the 
director. 
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's report, the 
director may issue a determination and order for 
dismissal of the adjudicative proceeding. 
(c) A party may make a written request to the 
director for an evidentiary hearing to review de novo the 
director's determination and order within 30 days of the 
date of the determination and order for dismissal. 
(d) If the director receives no timely request for 
a hearing, the determination and order issued by the 
director becomes the final order of the commission. 
(5) (a) If the initial attempts at settlement are 
unsuccessful and the investigator uncovers sufficient 
evidence during his investigation to support the 
allegations of a discriminatory or prohibited employment 
practice set out in the request for agency action, the 
investigator shall formally report these findings to the 
director. 
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's report the 
director may issue a determination and order based on the 
investigator's report. 
(c) A party may file a written request to the 
director for an evidentiary hearing to review de novo the 
director's determination and order within 30 days of the 
date of the determination and order. 
(d) If the director receives no timely request for 
a hearing, the determination and order issued by the 
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director requiring the respondent to cease any 
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice and to 
provide relief to the aggrieved party becomes the final 
order of the commission. 
(6) In any adjudicative proceeding, the investigator who 
investigated the matter may not participate in a hearing 
except as a witness, nor may he participate in the 
deliberations of the presiding officer. 
(7) Prior to commencement of an evidentiary hearing, the 
party filing the request for agency action may reasonably 
and fairly amend any allegation, and the respondent may 
amend its answer. Those amendments may be made during or 
after a hearing but only with permission of the presiding 
officer. 
(8) (a) If, upon all the evidence at a hearing, the 
presiding officer finds that a respondent has not engaged 
in a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice, 
the presiding officer shall issue an order dismissing the 
request for agency action containing the allegation of a 
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice. 
(b) The presiding officer may order that the 
respondent be reimbursed by the complaining party for his 
attorneys' fees and costs. 
(9) If upon all the evidence at the hearing, the 
presiding officer finds that a respondent has engaged in 
a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice, the 
presiding officer shall issue an order requiring the 
respondent to cease any discriminatory or prohibited 
employment practice and to provide relief to the 
complaining party, including reinstatement, back pay and 
benefits, and attorneys' fees and costs. 
(10) Conciliation between the parties is to be urged and 
facilitated at all stages of the adjudicative process. 
(11) (a) Either party may file a written request for 
review of the order issued by the presiding officer in 
accordance with Section 63-46b-12. 
(b) If there is no timely request for review the 
order issued by the presiding officer becomes the final 
order of the commission. 
(12) An order of the commission under Subsection (11)(a) 
is subject to judicial review as provided in Section 
63-46b-16. 
(13) The commission shall have authority to make rules 
concerning procedures under this chapter in accordance 
with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative 
Rulemaking Act. 
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RULES 
Anti-Discrimination Rules—Utah Administrative Code R560-1-3.G. 
For those procedures specified in Section 34-35-7.1(1)-
(5), U.C.A., the presiding officer shall be the Director 
or the Director's designee. The presiding officer for 
the formal hearing referred to in Section 34-35-7>l(6)-
(11), U.C.A., shall be appointed by the Commission. 
NATURE OF THE CASE, PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION 
AND STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For purposes of the issue addressed by this brief, the 
College's statement of the case is adequate. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The College argues that the Anti-Discrimination 
Division's determination, which determination is the basis for this 
proceeding, is invalid. The College's argument fails to properly 
consider the provisions of Utah's Anti-Discrimination Act. 
Furthermore, because the College did not raise the validity of the 
Division's determination during the administrative proceeding 
before the Commission, it cannot raise the issue now, for the first 
time on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION DIVISION'S DETERMINATION IS 
VALID. 
Whether the Anti-Discrimination Division's determination is 
valid must be judged in the context of the entire administrative 
procedure established by the Anti-Discrimination Act. For that 
reason, a summary of the administrative procedure is set forth 
below. 
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The Utah Anti-Discrimination Act (Utah Code Ann. §34-35-1 et 
seq.) creates Utah's "Anti-Discrimination Division" which is 
comprised of the three members of the Industrial Commission of 
Utah. Utah Code Ann. §34-35-4. The Commission, as Utah's Anti-
Discrimination Division, has jurisdiction over unlawful employment 
practices. Utah Code Ann. §34-35-3. 
The Anti-Discrimination Act grants the Commission specific 
authority to: 
(a) appoint and prescribe the duties of investigators 
and other employees and agents that it considers 
necessary for the enforcement of this chapter; 
(b) adopt, publish, amend, rescind rules, consistent 
with, and for the enforcement of this chapter. Utah Code 
Ann. §34-35-5 
While the Anti-Discrimination Act designates the Industrial 
Commission as Utah's Anti-Discrimination Division, the Act creates 
an administrative agency also known as the "Anti-Discrimination 
Division". The Division is under the jurisdiction and direction of 
the Commission. Utah Code Ann. §34-35-3 The Act also provides for 
a "director" of the Anti-Discrimination Division. Utah Code Ann. 
§34-35-3 The Director is answerable to the Commission: 
The division shall have as its immediate supervisory head 
a co-ordinator of fair employment practices. Such co-
ordinator shall be appointed by the commission. Any co-
ordinator shall at all times be under the direct 
supervision and control of the commission, (emphasis 
added) Utah Code Ann. §34-35-3. 
In addition to creating the foregoing administrative apparatus 
for enforcing the provisions of the Anti-Discrimination Act, the 
Act also establishes the following procedure for investigation and 
adjudication of discrimination complaints: 
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1) Any person may file a discrimination complaint with the 
Commission. Utah Code Ann. 34-35-7.1(1)(a) 
2) After a discrimination complaint is filed, the Commission 
must assign an investigator to attempt settlement of the complaint. 
Utah Code Ann. §34-35-7.1(3) 
3) If settlement is unsuccessful, an investigator 
investigates the circumstances of the complaint and reports the 
results of his or her investigation to the Director. Utah Code 
Ann. §34-35-7.1(4) and (5) 
4) Upon receipt of the investigator's report, the director 
may issue a determination and order based on the investigator's 
findings. Utah Code Ann. §34-35-7.1(5)(b) 
5) A party aggrieved by the Director's determination may 
request a de novo evidentiary hearing before an Administrative Law 
Judge. The ALJ then issues an order, with no deference to the 
Division's earlier determination. Utah Code Ann. §34-35-7.1(8) and 
(9) 
6) A party aggrieved by the ALJ's decision may file a motion 
for review of that decision with the Commission itself. The 
Commission is not bound by the determination of the Division or 
ALJ, and may affirm, reverse or modify the ALJ's decision as it 
sees fit in the light of the evidence and law. Utah Code Ann. §34-
35-7.1(11) 
7) The Commission's order is subject to appellate review 
under §63-46b-16 of Utah's Administrative Procedures Act. Utah 
Code Ann. §34-35-7.1(12) 
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The foregoing statutory steps are set forth in some detail to 
address some of the misapprehensions raised in the College's brief. 
When the College's argument is viewed in the context of the entire 
procedure established by the Anti-Discrimination Act, certain 
important points stand out. 
First, the Industrial Commission itself, serving as Utah's 
Anti-Discrimination Division, has full authority to order and 
oversee the activities of the Anti-Discrimination Division. While 
the Anti-Discrimination Act uses the Anti-Discrimination Division 
for investigation and screening, final administrative 
responsibility remains with the Commission, and not with the 
Director. 
Second, the Division Director's role in adjudication of 
discrimination complaints is limited. The Director is involved 
only at the early "screening" stages of the administrative process. 
The Director's discretion is also limited. The Anti-Discrimination 
Act directs the Director to issue her determination "based on the 
investigator's report". Thus, the Director's personal involvement 
is not essential to the adjudication of a discrimination complaint. 
Third, the Anti-Discrimination Act has established an 
administrative procedure that provides ample opportunity to correct 
any error made in the Anti-Discrimination Division's determination. 
Simply by asking for a hearing, an aggrieved party obtains a de 
novo evidentiary proceeding. Once an evidentiary hearing is 
requested, the Division's determination is of no further operative 
effect. Consequently, the College was not prejudiced by any 
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alleged error made in the Division's informal determination, since 
any such error could easily be corrected at an evidentiary hearing. 
Fourth and finally, the Commission has exercised its authority 
to appoint subordinates and promulgate rules in such a way as to 
resolve the very argument raised by the College. The Commission's 
Rule R560-1-3.G provides: 
For those procedures specified in Section 34-35-7.1(1)-
(5), U.C.A., the presiding officer shall be the Director 
or the Director's designee. (emphasis added) 
Thus, as needed, the Director can allow a designee to fulfill her 
functions. 
In this case, the Director deemed it necessary to recuse 
herself from this case due to her associations in the recent past 
with the defendant. While it is true that the reasons for the 
Director's recusal have been submitted by affidavit for the first 
time on appeal, that is simply due to the fact that the College did 
not raise the validity of the Division's determination during the 
earlier proceedings. The Commission cannot be expected to respond 
to an argument until that argument is raised. 
In summary, the Division Director's delegation of her 
functions in this case was proper under the provisions of the Anti-
Discrimination Act and the associated rules adopted by the 
Commission. 
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POINT TWO 
HAVING FAILED TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF THE VALIDITY OF THE 
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION DIVISIONS ORDER BEFORE THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION THE COLLEGE CANNOT RAISE THAT 
ISSUE ON APPEAL. 
Utah's appellate courts have consistently held that issues 
that could have been raised before an administrative agency, but 
were not, cannot later be raised for the first time on appeal. 
Alvin G. Rhoades Pump Sales v. Industrial Commission, 681 P.2d 
1244, 1249 (Utah 1984); Rekward v. Industrial Commission, 755 P.2d 
166 (Utah App. 1988) 
The College did not challenge the validity of the Anti-
Discrimination Division's Order at any time during the proceedings 
before the Commission. Recognizing that its failure to raise the 
issue is fatal to its attack on the validity of the Order, the 
College attempts to frame the issue as one of "jurisdiction". 
In United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, 344 U.S. 33, 73 
S.Ct 67, 68 (1952) the United States Supreme Court dealt with a 
similar issue, arising from a challenge to an order of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission, based upon the improper appointment 
of a hearing examiner, which challenge was raised for the first 
time on appeal. Writing for the majority, Justice Jackson stated: 
Appellee did not offer nor did the (lower) court require 
any excuse for its failure to raise the objection upon at 
least one of its many opportunities during the 
administrative proceeding . . . . 
The apparent reason for complacency was that it was not 
actually prejudiced by the content or manner of 
appointment of the examiner. . . . The issue is clearly 
an afterthought, brought forward at the last possible 
moment to undo the administrative proceedings without 
consideration of the merits and can prevail only from 
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technical compulsion irrespective of considerations of 
practical justice. 
(We) hold that the defect in the examiner's 
appointment was an irregularity which would invalidate a 
resulting order if the Commission had overruled an 
appropriate objection made during the hearing. But it is 
not one which deprives the Commission of power or 
jurisdiction, so that even in the absence of timely 
objection the order should be set aside as a nullity. 
In citing the foregoing opinion, the Commission in no way 
concedes that, in the case before the Court, the Director's recusal 
and delegation of her function to another was irregular or 
improper. Rather, the opinion is cited for the proposition that 
even if an irregularity occurred, it is not jurisdictional in 
nature and must be raised during the administrative proceedings in 
order to be preserved for consideration on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should disregard the College's challenge to the 
validity of the Anti-Discrimination Division's determination, since 
that issue was raised for the first time on appeal. Alternatively, 
if the Court concludes it is proper to consider that issue, the 
Court should conclude that the Division's determination is valid. 
DATED this 1st day of April, 1994. 
By 
Alan Hennebold, General Counsel 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
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PAUL S. KIRBY 
COMPLAINANT, 
VS. 
UADD NO. 92-0590 
EEOC NO. 35C-92-0611 
D E T E R M I N A T I O N 
JURISDICTION 
Under the authority vested in me by the Utah Anti-Discrimination 
Act, of 1965, as amended, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as 
amended, I issue on behalf of this Division, the following 
Determination as to the merits of the subject charge. 
All jurisdictional requirements have been met as required by the 
Utah Anti-Discrimination Act of 1965, as amended and Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
SUMMARY OF CHARGE 
On August 26, 1992, Paul S. Kirby, hereinafter Charging Party, 
alleged that Salt Lake Community College, hereinafter Respondent, 
discriminated against him based upon his sex, race, religion, and 
retaliated against him. 
SUMMARY OF RESPONSE 
The Respondent categorically denies that Charging Party was 
subjected to discrimination, because of his sex, race, religion, or 
that it retaliated against him. 
SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION 
A. Charging Party's Allegations 
Charging Party asserts that he was employed as an adjunct professor 
at Respondent during 1991. Charging Party asserts he ran into a 
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class scheduling conflict during the 1991 fall quarter. Charging 
Party asserts that he notified Mr. Stowers of such conflict. 
Charging Party asserts that he was eventually able to resolve the 
matter, and teach the class, but asserts that such incident caused 
Mr. Stowers to have animosities towards him. 
Charging Party asserts that subsequently, before winter quarter of 
1991, Charging Party went into Mr. Stower's office to look at his 
schedule. Charging Party asserts that Mr. Stowers told him that if 
anything occurred again like the scheduling conflict he had during 
fall quarter, Charging Party would never teach at Respondent again. 
Charging Party asserts that thereafter, he and Mr. Stowers did not 
speak to each other very often. 
Charging Party asserts that he was the most qualified applicant for 
the position, yet someone much less qualified than himself was 
afforded said position. Charging Party asserts that he attempted 
to resolve his concerns with Respondent's human resource 
department, to no avail. 
Charging Party asserts that in April, 1992, he submitted an 
application for a Spanish instructor position with Jonathan 
Stowers, Respondent's language coordinator. Charging Party asserts 
that he was denied due consideration for such employment, because 
he is non-hispanic, male, L.D.S., and because he objected to 
homosexual inferences during an interview with Mr. Stowers. 
Charging Party asserts that during his interview, Mr. Stowers 
received a telephone call. Charging Party asserts that after Mr. 
Stowers finished such call, he made sexual overtones towards 
Charging Party. Charging Party asserts that Mr. Stowers stated 
that he was so excited to hear this person's voice, that he almost 
wet his pants. Charging Party asserts that he was offended by Mr. 
Stower's mannerism. Charging Party asserts that Mr. Stower's knew 
that Charging Party was not homosexual. 
Charging Party asserts that subsequently during his interview, 
Charging Party commented about his Spanish L.D.S. mission, and how 
it had helped him with his knowledge of the Spanish language and 
culture. Charging Party asserts that during such discussion, Mr. 
Stowers squirmed, and made expressions that looked unfavorable. 
Charging Party asserts that Mr. Stowers also served a L.D.S. 
mission. Charging Party asserts however, that Mr. Stowers has made 
negative comments to his students regarding the L.D.S. religion. 
Charging Party asserts that he followed the proper chain of 
command, and requested information from Barbara Pomerang, Kay 
Waters and Carlos Jimenez of Respondent's affirmative action 
committee, David Richardson, Respondent's dean, and Anne Erickson, 
Respondent's vice president, as to why Charging Party fell out of 
the running for the subject position. Charging Party asserts that 
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said individuals either didn't know why he was dropped, or did not 
sufficiently answer his questions. Charging Party asserts that Mr. 
Jimenez told him that he had thoroughly investigated: Charging 
Party's case to see if religious discrimination was evident, and 
that he had interviewed the five employment committee members. 
Charging Party asserts that Mr. Jimenez refused to give him a copy 
of his investigative report. Charging Party asserts that Mr. 
Jimenez's investigation was not satisfactory. 
Charging Party asserts that he was qualified for the subject 
Spanish instructor position. Charging Party asserts that said 
position required a masters of science (hereinafter "M.S.," or a 
masters of art (hereinafter MM.A.,!) degree in Spanish, or a closely 
related field. Charging Party asserts that he has received two 
B.A.'s in political science and Spanish, respectively. Charging 
Party asserts that he received his masters degree in language and 
literature, with a Spanish emphasis, in 1991. Charging Party 
asserts that he has received a variety of scholarships, has been in 
various honor societies, and graduated with a 3.8 G.P.A., in the 
aforesaid graduate field. 
Charging Party asserts that teaching experience is preferred for 
the subject Spanish instructor position. Charging Party asserts 
that he has such experience, as he has taught Spanish at the 
University of Utah since 1988, at the Division of Continuing 
Education, and is currently an adjunct Spanish instructor at 
Respondent. Charging Party asserts that he has taught forty 
courses during his teaching career (i.e. five credit hours). 
Charging Party further asserts that he has also taken teaching 
methodology classes at the University of Utah. Charging Party 
further asserts that he has participated in workshops presented by 
the American Council on the Teaching of Foreign Languages, Inc. 
Charging Party asserts that preference for the subject Spanish 
instructor position was to be given to candidates with demonstrated 
strengths in community college teaching. Charging Party points out 
that his student evaluations at Respondent's community college, 
show that he had great success in the classroom, and was able to 
relate well to his students. 
Charging Party asserts that non-teaching related work experience 
was preferred for the subject position. Charging Party asserts 
that prior to, and during his studies as a student and as a 
teacher, at the University of Utah, he worked an average of 25 to 
30 hours per week in non-academic employment. Charging Party 
asserts that such non-academic employment consisted of: assistant 
manager of produce at Smith's Food King; member of a saxophone 
quartet, which performed "pro bono11 for convalescent homes, schools 
etc.; donated time to help Hispanic immigrants learn basic survival 
Spanish in the Salt Lake City area; donated time as a translator 
for world conferences for the L.D.S. church; and worked as a court 
interpreter for Spanish speaking individuals. 
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Charging Party asserts that the subject Spanish instructor position 
was filled by Laura Gaona-Bradford (hereinafter "Bradford"). 
Charging Party asserts that Ms. Bradford did not have heir masters 
degree at the time she applied for, and was interviewed for said 
position. Charging Party asserts that Ms. Bradford still did not 
have her masters degree as of October, 1992. Charging Party 
asserts that Ms. Bradford received her associate degree from 
Respondent, but does not have teaching experience at Respondent. 
Charging Party asserts that he has been discriminated against 
because of his sex, and his race. Charging Party asserts that Ms. 
Bradford is a female, Hispanic immigrant of Mexican heritage. 
Charging Party asserts that Respondent/s policy is to hire women 
and minorities to fill college goals. Charging Party asserts that 
such action is reverse discrimination, because Respondent's offers 
positions because of a person's circumstance rather then he or she 
being the most qualified. 
B. Respondent's Answer to Charging Party's Allegations 
Respondent contends that for affirmative action, an additional 
procedure had been initiated whereby all search committees are 
required to interview the top two qualified minorities in every 
applicant pool, regardless of their total point ranking. 
Respondent contends that those applicants that meet minimum 
qualifications are then screened against a written set of criteria, 
based upon the job qualification posted in the position 
announcement. 
Respondent contends that Charging Party applied for the Spanish 
faculty position. Respondent contends that Charging Party's 
application was received on April 30, 1992. Respondent contends 
that Charging Party was selected for, and interviewed by its search 
committee, based upon his ranking on set criteria. Respondent 
contends that Charging Party was then ranked number eleven out of 
thirteen applicants interviewed, and was not referred to the 
dean/division chair. Respondent contends that the top six 
applicants were referred on as the search committee's final 
candidates for said position. 
Respondent contends that the subject Spanish position was filled by 
Laura Gaona-Bradford, a Hispanic female. Respondent contends that 
her application was received on April 29, 1992. Respondent 
contends that Ms. Bradford was hired on July 30, 1992, as a full-
time salaried employee, and started her employment in fall quarter, 
1992. 
Respondent contends that Ms. Bradford was hired because of her 
strong educational background, excellent command of the Spanish 
language (i.e. her native language), and her teaching experience. 
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Respondent contends that Ms. Bradford was one of the two final 
applicants forwarded to the vice president by the dean. Respondent 
contends that such decision was based on Ms. Bradford's .ranking of 
structured questions asked by the dean and division chair. 
Respondent submits a summary of its investigatory report conducted 
by Carlos Jimenez. Mr. Jimenez contends that his investigation 
consisted of interviewing all search committee members. Mr. 
Jimenez contends that through such investigation, he was unable to 
find any evidence regarding Charging Party's allegations of 
discrimination based on race, sex, religion, or retaliation. Mr. 
Jimenez contends that at no time, as reported by the search 
committee members, was there any discussion formally or informally 
regarding any of the candidates' race, sex, or religion. Mr. 
Jimenez further contends that he also found no evidence of Charging 
Party's allegation that he was retaliated against. 
ANALYSIS 
Charging Party has brought this action against Respondent alleging 
violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Section 
2000(e), and the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act of 1965, Utah Code 
Annotated Sec. 34-35-6(1)(a), which provides that an employer may 
not discriminate against an employee on the basis of his/her sex, 
race, religion, or retaliate against any employee. 
A. Prima Facie Case of Sex Discrimination 
In order to prove discrimination based on sex exists, Charging 
Party must prove: 1) he is a member of a protected class; 2) he is 
qualified for the position; 3) he has been subjected to an adverse 
employment action; 4) similarly situated individuals, of a 
different class, were or would have been subjected to different 
treatment. 
Charging Party is a member of a protected class, male. Charging 
Party was qualified for the position of Spanish instructor, as he 
had met all of the minimum qualifications for such position. 
Charging Party has been subjected to an adverse employment 
decision, as he was not hired for the aforesaid position. The next 
question is whether or not similarly situated individuals of a 
different class, were or would have been subjected to different 
treatment. 
The record indicates that both Charging Party, a white male, and 
Laura Bradford, a Hispanic female, applied for the same Spanish 
faculty position. The record indicates that such position required 
that the applicant, at a minimum, have a masters degree in Spanish 
or a closely related field. The record indicates that Charging 
Party had said masters degree, but was not hired for the subject 
position. The record indicates that Ms. Bradford was hired for the 
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subject position, despite the fact that she did not possess the 
required masters degree. Therefore, Charging Party has established 
a prima facie case of sex discrimination. 
B. Prima Facie Case of Race Discrimination 
In order to make out a prima facie case of discrimination based 
upon race, the Charging Party must show that he is a member of a 
protected class and that he has been treated less favorable than 
others in circumstances which give rise to an inference of 
intentional discrimination. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. 
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). 
Charging Party is a member of a protected class, white. The next 
question is whether or not Charging Party has been treated less 
favorable than others in circumstances which give rise to an 
inference of intentional discrimination. 
The record indicates that both Charging Party, a white male, and 
Laura Bradford, a Hispanic female, applied for the same Spanish 
faculty position. The record indicates that such position required 
that the applicant, at a minimum, have a masters degree in Spanish 
or a closely related field. The record indicates that Charging 
Party had said masters degree, but was not hired for the subject 
position. The record indicates however, that Ms. Bradford was 
hired for the subject position, despite the fact that she did not 
possess the required masters degree. Therefore, Charging Party has 
established a prima facie case of race discrimination. 
C. Prima Facie Case of Religious Discrimination 
In order to establish a prima facie case of Religious 
Discrimination Charging Party must prove that: 1) he was a member 
of a protected class; 2) he was qualified for the position; and 3) 
he was not hired for said position because of his religious 
affiliation. Charging Party must maintain this burden to 
demonstrate that he was treated differently than similarly situated 
employees. 
Charging Party asserts that Mr. Stower's apparent dislike for the 
L.D.S. religion was a factor in his rejection of Charging Party for 
the subject position. However, the record indicates that Charging 
Party was not a member of the protected class, as he was active 
L.D.S. Charging Party has not asserted or established that his 
active L.D.S. status was in the minority at Respondent. 
Furthermore, Charging Party has not asserted or established that 
Ms. Bradford, the successful candidate, was non-L.D.S. or inactive 
L.D.S. Therefore, Charging Party has failed to establish a prima 
facie case of religion discrimination. 
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D. Prima Facie Case of Retaliation Discrimination 
In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation 
discrimination, Charging Party must demonstrate: 1) that he 
engaged in activities protected by the Act or Title VII; 2) the 
Respondent thereafter subjected him to adverse employment action; 
3) and that a causal link exists between the two. Love v. RE/MAX 
of America, Inc. , 738 F.2d 383, 385 (10th Cir. 1984); Burrus v. 
United Tel. Co., 683 F.2d 339, 343 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 459 
U.S. 1071 (1982). 
The record indicates that although there was some animosity 
between Charging Party and Mr. Stowers, Charging Party did not 
assert any claim of discrimination until after Ms. Bradford was 
hired, and he filed this claim. Therefore, Charging Party has 
failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation 
discrimination. 
E. Comparison 
Charging Party asserts that he is a white male, who possessed the 
minimum requirements for a Spanish faculty position, but was not 
hired. Charging Party asserts that Laura Bradford, a Hispanic 
female, was given said faculty position, despite her failure to 
possess the minimum requirements for such position. 
F. Respondent's Burden 
The next question is whether or not Respondent has articulated a 
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its conduct. Respondent's 
arguments are set forth below for completeness. 
Respondent contends that for affirmative action, an additional 
procedure had been initiated whereby all search committees are 
required to interview the top two qualified minorities in every 
applicant pool, regardless of their total point ranking. 
Respondent contends that those applicants that meet minimum 
qualifications are then screened against a written set of criteria, 
based upon the job qualification posted in the position 
announcement. 
Respondent contends that Charging Party applied for the Spanish 
faculty position. Respondent contends that Charging Party's 
application was received on April 30, 1992. Respondent contends 
that Charging Party was selected for, and interviewed by its search 
committee, based upon his ranking on set criteria. Respondent 
contends that Charging Party was then ranked number eleven out of 
thirteen applicants interviewed, and was not referred to the 
dean/division chair. Respondent contends that the top six 
applicants were referred on as the search committee's final 
candidates for said position. 
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Respondent contends that the subject Spanish position was filled by 
Laura Gaona-Bradford, a Hispanic female. Respondent contends that 
her application was received on April 29, 1992. .Respondent 
contends that Ms. Bradford was hired on July 30, 1992, as a full-
time salaried employee, and started her employment in fall quarter, 
1992. 
Respondent contends that Ms. Bradford was hired because of her 
strong educational background, excellent command of the Spanish 
language (i.e. her native language), and her teaching experience. 
Respondent contends that Ms. Bradford was one of the two final 
applicants forwarded to the vice president by the dean. Respondent 
contends that such decision was based on Ms. Bradford's ranking of 
structured questions asked by the dean and division chair. 
Respondent submits a summary of its investigatory report conducted 
by Carlos Jimenez. Mr. Jimenez contends that his investigation 
consisted of interviewing all search committee members. Mr. 
Jimenez contends that through such investigation, he was unable to 
find any evidence regarding Charging Party's allegations of 
discrimination based on race, sex, religion, or retaliation. Mr. 
Jimenez contends that at no time, as reported by the search 
committee members, was there any discussion formally or informally 
regarding any of the candidates' race, sex, or religion. Mr. 
Jimenez further contends that he also found no evidence of Charging 
Party's allegation that he was retaliated against. 
The record indicates that the subject Spanish faculty position was 
posted on March 27, 1992, and was closed on April 30, 1992. The 
record indicates that the minimum qualifications for such position 
are as follows: 
1. M.S. or M.A. degree in Spanish or closely related field 
required. 
2. Teaching experience preferred. Preference is given to 
candidates with demonstrated strength in community 
college teaching. 
3. Non-teaching related work experience preferred. 
The record indicates that at the time of his interview, Charging 
Party had a masters degree in languages and literature with a 
Spanish emphasis. The record indicates that the successful 
applicant, Laura Bradford, did not have a masters degree at the 
time of her interview, and was not expecting to receive such degree 
until June, 1992, nearly two months after the subject position 
closed. 
The record indicates that both Charging Party and Ms. Bradford had 
teaching experience. The record indicates that Charging Party had 
more college level teaching experience. 
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The record indicates that Charging Party had demonstrated strength 
in community college teaching, whereas Ms. Bradford did not have 
any community college teaching experience. 
The record indicates that both Charging Party and Ms. Bradford had 
similar non-teaching related work experience. The record indicates 
that Charging Party appears to have had more such experience. 
The record indicates that Ms. Bradford did not have the minimum 
requirements for the subject position, as she did not have a 
master's degree, or the preferred levels of experience. 
Furthermore, as a result of such deficiency, and according to 
Respondent's policy, Ms. Bradford should not have been considered 
for the subject position. Therefore, Respondent has not 
articulated a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its conduct. 
G. Summary 
Charging Party has failed to establish a prima facie case of 
religion and retaliation discrimination. However, Charging Party 
has established a prima facie case of sex and race discrimination. 
Therefore, the facts in the record, viewed in their entirety, 
indicate that there is REASONABLE CAUSE to believe that Charging 
Party was subjected to discriminatory practices as alleged. This 
concludes the Division's informal investigative adjudication 
procedure. 
ON BEHALF OF THE DIVISION, 
Randall Phillips, Investigator y Date 
Collen Trayner, Esquire Date A 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION DIVISION 
UADD Case No. 92-0590 
EEOC No. 35C-92-0611 
PAUL S. KIRBY * 
COMPLAINANT, * 
* 
VS. * O R D E R 
SALT LAKE COMMUNITY COLLEGE, * 
RESPONDENT. * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
7> . . . . . . 
On January 2?£t 1993, the Anti-Discrimination Division (Division) of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah (Commission) issued a determination of 
"Reasonable Cause" that the Respondent has violated the Utah Anti-
Discrimination Act of 1965, Chapter 35, Title 34, Utah Code Annotated, as 
amended, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. 
If the Respondent is desirous of attempting to conciliate this Determination, 
this must be done by contacting the director within ten (10) days from the 
date of this Order. Failure to reach conciliation shall result in the 
Respondent being required to provide the following relief: 
RELIEF 
The Respondent, UTAH COMMUNITY COLLEGE, is hereby ordered to provide full 
relief to Charging Party, PAUL S. KIRBY. Full relief shall include: 
1. That Respondent provide Charging Party with a position commensurate with 
a full-time faculty position in Spanish, effective immediately; 
2. Further, that the Respondent agrees to provide Charging Party with all 
lost wages, plus 10%; 
3. Further, that no retaliation be brought by Respondent against the 
Charging Party for bringing this action; 
4. Further, that Charging Party be awarded reasonable attorneys fees; 
5* Further, that Respondent reaffirms its commitment to comply with the 
Utah Anti-Discrimination Act of 1965, Chapter 35, Title 34, Utah Code 
Annotated, as amended, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as 
amended. 
If a party wishes to appeal this Order, a written request for a formal 
hearing must be filed with the Director of the Division within thirty (30) 
days from the date of the issuance of this Order as specified in Section 34-
35-7.1(4)(c), U.C.A., and Administrative Rule R560-1-4.A.3 and 4. A request 
for agency review and a formal hearing will not be considered necessary if 
the hearing will not add to the evidence in the investigatory file or cause 
the evidence to be viewed differently. 
If the Director receives no timely request for a hearing, this Order becomes 
the final Order of the Commission with no further rights of appeal as 
specified in Section 34-35-7.1(4)(d), U.C.A. 
Colleen Trayner, Esquire Date Q 
REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
SALT i 
LAKE I 
COMMUNITY 
COLLEGE 
4600 South Redwood Road / P.O. Box 30808 / Salt Lake City, Utah 84130-0808 
Telephone (801) 967-4111 FAX (801) 965-8008 
February 18, 1993 
Ms. Anna Jensen l £ C E l V E D 
State of Utah I C U P V I - I - ' ^y 
Industrial Commission of Utah ' ^ 
Anti-Discrimination Division -*w j iQQS ^T\ 
160 East 300 South, Third Floor v ^ c ^ 
s a l t Lake c i t y , UT 84111
 INDUSTRW.C0MW6H0N 
Re: Paul s . Kirby -4Tl-DiSCBlM\NAT\0NDIVIS^ 
UADD No, 9 2 - 0 5 9 0 
EEOC No- 35C-92-0611 
Dear Ms- Jensen: 
This letter is in response to the Division's determination and 
order dated January 22, 1993, filed with the Anti-Discrimination 
Division. The Salt Lake Community College is respectfully 
requesting that a formal hearing be granted based on the 
following supportive information. 
As I indicated earlier in my investigative report, which included 
interviewing all search committee members, there was no evidence 
supporting the charging party's allegations- The search 
committee members reported that at no time was there any 
discussion formally or informally regarding any of the candidates 
race, sex, or religion. 
Please find below a response to each of the Division's findings 
of Sex and Race Discrimination. 
A. Prima Facie Case of Sex Discrimination 
Our response to the Division's findings is as follows. The 
hiring of Laura Bradford was contingent upon her completion of 
her master's degree. As stated in the advertisements, the 
master's degree was not required until the fall of 1992. 
Therefore, Ms. Bradford could and did complete her master's 
degree at any time during fall quarter of 1992. 
B. Prima Facie Case of Race Discrimination 
Our response to the Division's findings is as follows. The 
charging party asserts that he was treated less favorably than 
others. His assumptions are unfounded. The correct evidence as 
, , 00S51 
Ms- Anna Jensen 2 February 23, 1993 
stated above, is the master's degree was not required until 
sometime during the fall of 1992. The record will show that Ms. 
Laura Bradford did indeed fulfill this requirement by completing 
requirements for the degree during fall of 1992. 
Ms. Bradford filled all expectations of the job as advertised. 
(Attachments) The decision to hire Ms. Bradford was based on her 
qualifications, not gender. The Division concluded a prima-facie 
case of sex and race discrimination based on unfounded 
assumptions and erroneous understanding. The Division's analysis 
relied on the fact that Ms. Bradford didn't have an MS degree. 
The correct evidence is, the master's degree was not required 
until sometime during fall quarter and the two attached 
announcements clearly demonstrate this. Further, she did fulfill 
the requirements of the master's degree during fall quarter. 
This is common practice in higher education. 
Furthermore, the Salt Lake Community College feels that a formal 
hearing should also be granted based on the fact that the hiring 
of Ms. Laura Bradford was consistent with the College's hiring 
procedures and our Affirmative Action Plan. To have decided 
otherwise would have put the College in violation of our own 
internal procedures. 
In addition, we ask that the conclusions of "religious 
discrimination11 and "retaliation" decided in our favor by the 
investigator be upheld. 
Your favorable response to this request is appreciated. If I can 
be of any further assistance, please feel free to contact me at 
967-4561. 
Sincerely, 
Carlos A. Jimenez j ^ 
Director <t>f Divers/ty/EO 
CJ/cb V / 
cc: Colleen Trayner 
Randall Phillips 
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ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-6615 
Paul S. Kirby, 
Charging Party, 
vs. 
Salt Lake Community College, 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
ORDER OF 
DISMISSAL 
UADD No. 
EEOC No. 
92-0590 
35C-92-0611 
Respondent. * 
********************************* 
The request for an evidentiary hearing in the above 
entitled matter to review de novo the Determination and Order of 
the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division having been duly considered, 
and it having been determined that the RESPONDENT has failed to: 
File its request for de novo review within 3 0 days of the 
date of the order as required by R560-1-4A(3) of the Utah Admin, 
Code (1993); 
And it appearing that the foregoing constitutes good 
cause for dismissing the request, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the request of the 
RESPONDENT be, and the same is hereby, dismissed without prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review or 
specific written objection hereto must be filed with the Commission 
within thirty (3 0) days from the date of this Order, or it shall be 
the final Order of the Commission, not subject to further review or 
appeal. A Motion for Review must be signed by the party seeking 
review; state the grounds for review and the relief requested; 
state the date upon which it was mailed; and be sent by mail to the 
undersigned, and to each party. 
Timothy^ c7 Mien 
Presiding (jfcamini nmin strative Law Judge 
Certified by the Industrial Commission of 
Utah this //&day of~?W«^^L 1993. 
ATTEST: ' 
Patricia O Commission Secretary 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on March /J , 1993, a copy of the 
attached Order of Dismissal in the UADD case of Paul S. Kirby vs. 
Salt Lake Community College, was mailed to the following persons at 
the following addresses, postage paid: 
Paul S. Kirby 
290 North 5th East 
Kaysville, UT 84037 
Carlos A. Jimenez 
Director of Diversity/EO 
Salt Lake Community College 
P.O. Box 30808 
SLC, UT 84130-0611 
Anna R. Jensen 
Director 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
UADD Division 
160 East 300 South 
SLC, UT 84114-6630 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
By ~^LC»<-^ /So^u^r^f^^ 
Wilma Burrows 
Adjudication Division 
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MOTION FOR REVIEW 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Attorney General 
JOHN S. MCALLISTER (2140) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Beneficial Life Tower, Suite 1100 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 533-3220 
IN THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, STATE OF UTAH 
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION DIVISION 
PAUL S. KIRBY, 
Charging Party, : OBJECTION TO AND MOTION FOR 
REVIEW OF ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
vs. : 
SALT LAKE COMMUNITY COLLEGE, : UADD No. 92-0590 
Respondent. : EEOC No. 35C-92-0611 
Respondent Salt Lake Community College through its 
counsel John S. McAllister, Assistant Attorney General, enters 
its Motion for Review and its written objection to the Order of 
Dismissal dated March 11, 1993, received March 12, 1993, by 
Timothy C. Allen, presiding Administrative Law Judge, which 
orders that the request of Respondent Salt Lake Community College 
for evidentiary hearing and review de novo be dismissed without 
prejudice and allowing Objection To and Motion for Review of the 
Order of Dismissal to be filed within 30 days of the date of said 
order, March 11, 1993. 
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FACTS 
Paul Kirby, the Charging Party and Complainant in this 
matter filed his complaint with the Utah Anti-discrimination 
Division (UADD) alleging discrimination based on sex, race, 
religion and retaliation when Salt Lake Community College hired 
another person for a faculty position. The UADD investigator 
made a determination that there was no discrimination with regard 
to religion or retaliation, but found cause for a prima facie 
case for sex and race discrimination. The investigator relied on 
the sole fact that the position required a Master's degree and 
Mr. Kirby, a white male with a Master's degree was unsuccessful 
and the position was awarded to a "female hispanic immigrant of 
mexican heritage despite the fact that she did not possess the 
required Master's degree." She was awarded her degree in the 
fall. 
The investigator's report and order were signed on 
January 22, 1993, and received by Respondent on January 26, 199 3. 
In the order Respondent was allowed 30 days from the date of the 
order January 22, 1993, to file a request for a hearing and 
review. The 30 days period ended on Sunday, February 21, 1993. 
The request for review was filed on Tuesday, February 23, 1993. 
No allowance was made for mail delivery time by the UADD thus 
effectively reducing the time period to 24 days. 
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Complainant through his counsel filed a Motion to 
Strike Respondent's Request for a Hearing because it was untimely 
(not filed within the 30 day period). Complainant's motion was 
dated March 5, and received on March 8, 199 3. Respondent fiLed 
its response and explanation on March 12, 199 3. 
On March 11, 1993, presiding Administrative Law Judge 
Timothy C. Allen signed an Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice, 
denying Respondent's Request for Review de novo because it was 
not filed within the 30 day period. The denial resulted in an 
order with Complainant's pleading dated March 5, before the 
division, and Respondent's pleading dated March 12, not before 
the division: 
OBJECTION TO DISMISSAL OF RESPONDENT'S REQUEST 
Respondent objects to the order of March 11, 1993, 
because: 
1) The order was made only 3 days after receipt of 
Complainant's pleading on March 8, 1993, and without any 
reasonable opportunity for Respondent to reply. 
2) The order was made with only Complainant's pleading 
before the division with absolutely no consideration of 
Respondent's reply which was filed on March 12, only four days 
after receipt of Complainant's motion. 
-3-
00S89 
3) No system of pleading which allows pleading by mail 
has any period so short as 3 days. To decide a matter on such 
short notice with only one party's pleading before it is 
manifestly unfair and prejudicial to Respondent and clearly 
contrary to the law which require the division to be fair and 
unbiased toward both parties. 
MOTION FOR REVIEW 
Respondent Salt Lake Community College hereby moves for 
a review of this matter and for a full and complete evidentiary 
hearing for the following reasons: 
1. The order of March 11, 199 3, signed by presiding 
Administrative Law Judge Timothy C. Allen dismisses Respondent's 
First Request for Review "without prejudice." Without prejudice 
clearly means that the request can be brought before the division 
again. 
Also, the order clearly states that a new Motion for 
Review can be filed by Respondent within 30 days from March II, 
1993. The order further stares that only if a. new Motion for 
Review is filed after the 30 day period will the order of March 
11, 199 3, become the final order of the commission and not 
subject to further review by the commission. 
-4-
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Because this Motion for Review and Objection is timely, 
the order of January 22, 1993, and the order of March 11, 199 3, 
are subject to review. 
2. Respondent has further information to place before 
the commission which it believes will cause the division to view 
differently its previous finding of a prima facie case of 
discrimination- Without a full review and hearing the Respondent 
will be severely and unfairly prejudiced in this matter. 
a. The investigative report, findings and order are 
based solely on the allegation that the hispanic female did not 
have a Master's degree. The true and accurate fact is that the 
position was advertised according to the College's customary 
practice to require that the degree be earned in the fall of the 
year. The masters degree was earned in compliance with that 
practice, but the investigator ignored that material fact. 
b. Respondent has an affirmative action plan which 
requires the College to take affirmative action regarding 
hispanic persons and females. The plan is a legal requirement 
consistent with Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
objectives. The College is required to follow its own plan. The 
investigator was aware of this plan, but ignored it in his 
analysis of a prima facie case. The requirement of the College 
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to follow its own policy is a fact critical to any considered 
analysis. 
c. The investigator totally ignored the College 
selection process. In this case the hispanic female received a 
higher ranking than Complainant in the screening process and a 
much higher score in the interview. Thus, the person selected 
was selected on her merits and qualifications for the particular 
position, not because she was hispanic or female. But the 
investigator's analysis leaves the individuals' relative 
qualifications totally without consideration. 
If the order is allowed to stand, the result will 
compel the College to substitute the Complainant for the better 
qualified person, a result totally contrary to the College's 
policy of selecting the best person for the job. 
d. The law and division rules clearly allow time 
periods to be enlarged and responses to be amended. The time 
period should be enlarged to accept Respondent's response and the 
response should be amended to reflect the supporting information 
with the true and accurate information about the College's 
selection. To continue to rely on the investigator's inadequate 
analysis and incorrect assumptions is unfair and prejudicial. 
In summary of its Motion for Review, Respondent College 
followed its own policy and practice in selecting the person best 
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qualified for the position. The person obtained a Master's 
degree as specified and in the time required. The selection was 
not based on race or sex, and was consistent with the affirmative 
action plan. 
The investigator's analysis is incomplete and his 
findings are based on insufficient information. In short, his 
findings, report and order are seriously flawed. The College is 
entitled to place the true and correct information before the 
commission or division in fair and impartial hearing before a 
final determination is made. 
RELIEF REQUESTED 
Respondent Salt Lake Community College requests an 
impartial review. Such review is absolutely necessary. All the 
information and documents relevant to the Respondent's decision 
to employ the best qualified person without illegal 
discrimination on the basis of sex or race must be considered 
before a final decision is made. 
The Respondent further requests that its initial 
response be amended as necessary to reflect the full and complete 
basis for its decision. 
The Respondent further requests that the order of March 
11, 1993, dismissing Respondent's request for an evidentiary 
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hearing be reversed and the review allowed; or, in the 
alternative that a hearing and review be granted by the 
commission as stated in the order of March 11, 19 93. 
Respondent reserves the right to amend its response and 
supplement its pleadings by affidavit prior to a hearing as 
allowed by division rules. 
Dated this // day of March, 1993. 
Lssistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Respondent 
Salt Lake Community College 
CERTIFICATE OF FILING 
I hereby certify that the original of the foregoing 
Objection To and Motion for Review of Order of Dismissal was hand 
delivered by me personally to the Utah Anti-discrimination 
Division Office on the day of March, 1993. 
s. MCALLISTER 
5sistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Respondent 
Salt Lake Community College 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this ^y day of 
, 1993, I mailed an accurate photocopy of the 
foregoing Affidavit of J, Clark Whitehead to the following 
address: 
Louise T. Knauer 
Attorney for Complainant 
261 East 300 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84111 
Carlos A, Jimenez 
Director of Diversity and Equal 
Opportunity 
Salt Lake Community College 
P.O. Box 30808 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130 
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ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-6600 
PAUL S. KIRBY, * 
Charging Party, * ORDER DENYING 
vs. * 
* MOTION FOR REVIEW 
SALT LAKE COMMUNITY COLLEGE, * 
* 
Respondent. * UADD No. 920590 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
The Industrial Commission of Utah (Commission) reviews the 
Motion for Review of the charging party in the above captioned 
matter, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, §§ 34-35-7.1(11) and 63-
46b-12. 
The Utah Anti-Discrimination Division (UADD) issued a "cause" 
finding in the above captioned matter by Order dated January 22, 
1993. The Order stated that the non-prevailing party had 30 days 
to request an evidentiary hearing. On February 23, 1993, the UADD 
received the respondent's request for an evidentiary hearing. The 
request for an evidentiary hearing was denied by order issued on 
March 11, 1993, because it was not filed within 30 days of the date 
the order was issued as required by U.A.C. R560-1-4A(3) and U.C.A. 
§ 34-35-7.1(4) (c) . Our decision in this case is based upon 
jurisdictional issues and, therefore, we will not address the 
merits of the underlying case. 
On March 11, 1993 the Commission received a letter from 
respondent which stated that the respondent, "had a conversation 
with the Director of UADD, Ms. Anna Jensen. I had indicated to her 
that the College would indeed request a review of the findings by 
UADD...." The letter stated that n[t]he reason for the delay was 
due to a recent college internal procedural change. The new 
procedure requires such correspondence as the one requested to be 
circulated and viewed by appropriate College department heads." 
Letter from Mr. Jimenez, 03/11/93. 
On March 17, 1993, the respondent filed its motion for review 
of the ALJ's March 11, 1993 order raising three issues: (1) 
whether the commission failed to allow a reasonable opportunity for 
Respondent to respond to the charging party's pleading before the 
order was issued; (2) whether the order was issued without 
consideration of Respondent's reply memorandum; and (3) whether the 
commission's action was manifestly unfair and prejudicial to 
Respondent and clearly contrary to the law which requires the 
Division to be fair and unbiased toward both parties. 
The respondent, citing U.C.A. § 63-46b-l(9), requested that 
the commission allow additional time for filing its motion for 
review after the time for filing had run. The charging party 
asserts that U.C.A. § 63-46b-l(9) does not apply in this case 
because the time period in question is set out in U.C.A. § 34-35-
nofti4 
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7.1(4)(c), not the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA). U.C.A. 
§ 63-46b-l(9) provides that: 
Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to 
restrict a presiding officer, for good cause 
shown, from lengthening or shortening any time 
period prescribed in this chapter, except those 
time periods established for judicial review. 
In order for a provision in a statute such as the Utah Anti-
Discrimination Act to supersede a similar provision in the UAPA, the 
statute must make explicit reference to the UAPA. U.C.A. § 63-46b-
1(1). U.C.A. § 34-35-7.1(4) (c) does not state that it is intended 
to supersede the time periods set out in the UAPA, and therefore, the 
time for filing a request for formal hearing is governed by U.C.A. § 
63-46b-12. However, there is no conflict as both statutes establish 
a 30 day time period for filing an appeal. 
However, the Court of Appeals in Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. 
Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989), held that the time for 
filing a motion for review to the Industrial Commission is 
jurisdictional. The court reasoned that the mandatory language in 
the statute terminated the commission's jurisdiction once the filing 
time period was exceeded and noted that its interpretation of the 
statute was consistent with Utah appellate court decisions on similar 
time limits. Lamoreaux at 570. U.C.A. § 34-35-7.1(d) provides that, 
,f[i]f the director receives no timely request for a hearing, the 
determination and order issued by the director becomes the final 
order of the commission.,f 
"Subject matter jurisdiction is the power and 
authority of the court to determine a contro-
versy and without which it cannot proceed." 
Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah 
App. 1987) . If a court acts beyond its 
authority those acts are null and void. Jd. . . . 
The sources of jurisdictional limits may vary 
according to they type of court involved. 
However, it is basic that "the jurisdictional 
limits of a statutorily created court... are 
circumscribed by its empowering legislation." 
Id. It follows that the subject matter 
jurisdiction of a quasi-judicial administrative 
agency, such as the Industrial Commission, which 
is a statutory creation, would also be "fixed by 
statute." Retherford v. Industrial Comm'n of 
Utah, 739 P.2d 76, 80 (Utah App. 1987). Just 
as any court, the Commission should first 
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determine that it has jurisdiction and, if it 
does not, dismiss the matter. Any action 
beyond its jurisdiction is void, 
Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Ut. Ct. App. 
1989) . 
An agency order is considered "issued" on the date the order 
is signed by the administrative law judge or commission. Bonded 
Bicycle Couriers v. Dept. of Empl. Sec. , 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 79 (CA, 
12/04/92). Therefore, the order in this matter was issued on 
January 22, 1992 and that is the date that the time for filing 
began to run. The Respondent failed to timely request an extension 
of time in which to file or timely file its motion for review. 
Therefore, the commission lacks jurisdiction to take any action 
other than to dismiss this matter. 
ORDER: 
IT IS ORDERED that the ORDER OF DISMISSAL issued by the 
administrative law judge on March 11, 1993 is hereby affirmed. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah 
Court of Appeals within 3 0 days of the date of the order, pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-46b-16, and Couriers v. Dep't of 
Empl. Sec, et al., 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 79 (CA, 12/4/92). The 
requesting party shall bear all costs to prepare a transcript of 
the hearing for appeals purposes. 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
2 C L 
Certified this /j£ 
ATTEST: 
tL day of *~}VJr<^ 
Patricia 0. Ashbyj I 
Commission Secret?*-^ " 
Colleen S. Colta 
Commissioner 
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JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Attorney General 
JOHN S. MCALLISTER (214 0) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Beneficial Life Tower, Suite 1100 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 533-3220 
IN THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, STATE OF UTAH 
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION DIVISION 
PAUL S. KIRBY, 
Charging Party, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COMMUNITY COLLEGE, 
Respondent. 
: RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION AND 
: CLARIFICATION OF THE 
COMMISSION'S ORDER 
UADD No. 92-0590 
EEOC No. 35C-92-0611 
Respondent Salt Lake Community College through its 
counsel John S. McAllister, Assistant Attorney General, moves the 
Industrial Commission of Utah for a reconsideration and 
clarification of its order dated May 14, 1993: 
ORDER: 
IT IS ORDERED that the ORDER OF DISMISSAL issued 
by the administrative law judge on March 11, 1993 is 
hereby affirmed, 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to 
the Utah Court of Appeals within 30 days of the date of 
the order, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-
46B-16, and Couriers v. Dep't of EmpL Sec, et al., 201 
Utah Adv. Rep. 79 (CA, 12/4/92). The requesting party 
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shall bear all costs to prepare a transcript of the 
hearing for appeals purposes. 
The foregoing order precludes Respondent from due process for the 
sole reason that its request for a hearing was one day beyond the 
30 day period set for filing requests. This Motion to Reconsider 
or Clarify is made for the following reasons: 
1. The order of March 11, 1993, by the Administrative 
Law Judge, and affirmed by the Commission Order quoted above 
dismisses this matter "without prejudice." This phrase clearly 
implies that Respondent can move again for a hearing and one 
could be granted. It must be remembered that the Administrative 
Law Judge made his order on March 11, 1993, with Complainant's 
pleading but without Respondent's pleading before him. The 
result was either to allow Respondent to request a hearing 
"without prejudice" or to deny the request for a hearing which 
denial is manifestly unfair. If a hearing is denied, then the 
Commission ought to clarify the phrase "without prejudice" which 
was affirmed by its Order of May 14, 1993. 
2. The Commission's order of May 14, 1993, recognizes 
three issues raised by Respondent, but declines to discuss or 
consider the issues. The Commission relies on the case of Varian 
- Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989) to 
support its determination of no jurisdiction. 
-2-
Lamoreaux does not compel an outright dismissal. 
Lamoreaux reversed the Commission and remanded for a hearing to 
determine the effect of the Administrative Law Judge's order. 
The Commission should remand this case to the Administrative Law 
Judge to clarify his order consistent with Lamoreaux. 
Moreover, the Lamoreaux opinion relies on the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure (U.R.C.P.) to calculate the time period 
for an Industrial Commission appeal: 
"Such motion [for review] must be filed 
within fifteen days of the date of any order 
of the administrative law judge or 
commission-..." Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-82.55 
(1987) (effective until Jan. 1, 1988). 
Additional days will be allowed when the 
filing is sent by mail or when the last day 
of the period falls on a weekend or a 
holiday. Utah R.Civ.P. 6. 
Lamoreaux, 161 P.2d 569, 570 ftnt. 1. (emphasis supplied). In 
footnote one the Court of Appeals indicates that Rule 6 U.R.C.P. 
is applicable. If Rule 6 is applicable to compute time it is 
also applicable to allow time for mailing. Rule 6 clearly 
requires 3 days to be added when documents are served by mail: 
(e) Additional time after service by mail. 
Whenever a party has the right or is required 
to do some act or take some proceedings 
within a prescribed period after the service 
of a notice or other paper upon him and the 
notice or paper is served upon him by mail, 3 
days shall be added to the prescribed period. 
Rule 6(e) U.R.C.P. 
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In this case, the original order was signed on January 
22, 1993, and served by mail and received and date stamped on 
January 26, 1993. Rule 6 clearly requires 3 extra days to allow 
a party to take action when he has been served by mail and he is 
required to take that action within a prescribed period. In this 
case because the original order was served by mail Respondent had 
33 days or until February 24, 1993, and its filing was timely 
under the correct application of Rule 6, U.R.C.P., pursuant to 
Lamoreaux. See also Griffith v. Industrial Commission/ 399 P.2d 
204 (Utah 1965) where the Utah Supreme Court held that Rule 6(e) 
U.R.C.P. was not inconsistent with and not clearly inapplicable 
to Industrial Commission procedure and therefore supplemented 
Commission procedure to allow timely filing of a petition for 
rehearing not filed within the 30 day period, 
3. Most cases are judged on their merits. In this 
case the original investigator's report was erroneous and 
incomplete. The investigator selected certain evidence and 
ignored other material facts. Respondent should be given a 
hearing to demonstrate that the investigator's prima facie 
determination of discrimination is erroneous and unfair. 
Respondent's Affidavit as to the correct evidence is on file. 
A hearing would develop appropriate evidence and 
findings as a basis for a correct considered decision which could 
-4-
then be reviewed. To preclude Respondent from a hoaiu 
manifestly unfair and in direct violation of tho legi*> 
• > - The direction to investigate in fairness to all parties. 
Commission should allow the investigator, the D>L°C 
Administrative Law Judge to correct this mistake-
Wherefore, Respondent respectfully requests 
Industrial Commission of Utah for a reconsideration of 
^ Hndinqs before 
decision and to allow a hearing with evidence nno 
<-\,<z the Commission to 
making a final order. Further, Respondent asks i-n 
clarify the order affirmed being '"without prejudice. 
Dated this day of May, 199-*-
distant Attorney General 
Counsel for ^ ^ " ^ " V o l l e c e Salt Lake Community College 
CERTIFICATE OF FILING 
• • i ^f t-hp foregoing 
I hereby certify that the original of w e 
^r t-hp Commission's 
Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification ot cue 
Order was hand delivered by me personally to the Uta 
IS* 1 Q Q "3 
discr iminat ion Division Office on the sh£> daY o f M a y ' 
Ass is tant Attorney General 
Counsel for ^ 3 P ° n d ^ t r o l l e a e Sal t Lake Community College 
-
5
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this "^C day of May, 1993, I 
mailed an accurate photocopy of the foregoing Motion for 
Reconsideration and Clarification of the Commissions's Order to 
the following address: 
Louise T. Knauer 
Attorney for Complainant 
261 East 300 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Carlos Jimenez 
Director of Diversity 
Salt Lake Community College 
P.O. Box 30808 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130 
J. Clark Whitehead 
Director, Personnel Services 
Salt Lake Community College 
P.O. Box 30808 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130 
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ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-6600 
PAUL S. KIRBY, * 
* 
Charging Party, * ORDER ON MOTION 
vs. * FOR RECONSIDERATION 
* AND CLARIFICATION 
SALT LAKE COMMUNITY COLLEGE, * 
* 
Respondent- * UADD No. 92 0590 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
The Industrial Commission of Utah (commission) reviews the 
Motion for Review of the respondent in the above captioned matter, 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, § 63-46b-13. 
The respondent timely filed a motion for reconsideration of 
the commissions denial of its motion for review of an 
administrative law judge's (ALJ) order dismissing its request for 
a formal hearing under the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act. 
The respondent requests (1) that the commission clarify the 
phrase "without prejudice" in the ALJ's order which was affirmed by 
the commission, and (2) that the commission re-examine its 
determination that it lacks jurisdiction to hear its motion for 
review. We will examine these issues in reverse order. 
I. DOES RULE 6(e) APPLY TO EXTEND THE 
PERIOD FOR FILING A MOTION FOR REVIEW? 
The respondent argues that Varian-Eimac v. Lamoreaux, 767 P. 2d 
569 (Ut. App. 1989) (Lamoreaux I) , does not compel an outright 
dismissal and points to footnote one of that opinion which states 
in part that, "Additional days will be allowed when the filing is 
sent by mail or when the last day of the period falls on a weekend 
or a holiday. Utah R. Civ. P. 6." Lamoreaux I, 767 P. 2d 569, 570, 
fn. 1. The respondent further asserts that the Utah Supreme Court 
in Griffith v. Industrial Commission, 300 P.2d 204 (Utah 1965), 
held that Rule 6(e) U.R.C.P. was not inconsistent with and not 
clearly inapplicable to Industrial Commission procedure and 
therefore supplemented Commission procedure to allow timely filing 
of a petition for rehearing not filed within the 30 day time 
period. 
In Lamoreaux I the commission granted the untimely filed 
motion for review and reversed the ALJ. The commissions decision 
was appealed by the respondent to the court of appeals which held 
that the time limit for filing a motion for review before the 
commission was jurisdictional. The case was remanded so that the 
commission could take evidence on the issue of whether the 
applicant's motion for review was timely filed. 
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Griffith and Lamoreaux I are both pre-Utah Administrative 
Procedure Act (UAPA) decisions. The Utah Supreme Court in Griffith 
concluded that Rule 81(a) U.R.C.P., which provides that lf[t]hese 
rules shall apply to all special statutory proceedings, except 
insofar as such rules are by their nature clearly inapplicable11 
applied the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to supplement the rules 
of procedure of the Industrial Commission. The Griffith Court held 
that Rule 6(e) U.R.C.P. applies to extend the time for filing a 
petition for rehearing when the notice was served by mail. Rule 1, 
U.R.C.P., however, provides that "[t]hese rules shall govern the 
procedure in the Supreme Court, the district courts, the circuit 
courts, and the justice courts of the state of Utah in all actions, 
suits and proceedings of a civil nature, whether cognizable at law 
or in equity, and in all special statutory proceedings, except as 
governed by other rules promulgated by this court or enacted by the 
Legislature and except as stated in Rule 81." 
In a later ruling, the Utah Supreme Court noted that lf[w]hile 
the mode of procedure before administrative bodies may conform to 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the rules governing civil 
procedure in the trial courts are not necessarily applicable to 
administrative proceedings. See e.g. Silverman v. Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm'n, 549 F.2d 28 (7th Cir. 1977) .... Thus, 
administrative proceedings are not subject to the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure unless the governing statute or regulations so 
provide." Pilcher v. Dep't of Social Services, 663 P.2d 450 (Utah 
1983). We believe that the rule articulated in Pilcher correctly 
determines the applicability of the U.R.C.P. to administrative 
proceedings in Utah. 
The UAPA provides in relevant part that "except as otherwise 
provided by a statute superseding provisions of this chapter by 
specific reference to this chapter, the provisions of this chapter 
apply to every agency of the state of Utah..." U.C.A. §~63-46b-
1(1) (1992) . The UAPA does not state generally that the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure apply to all administrative proceedings. To the 
contrary, the UAPA contains only limited, specific references to 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See U.C.A. § 63-46b-l(4)(b) 
(providing that Rules 12(b) and 56 U.R.C.P. apply to motions to 
dismiss or for summary judgment except to the extent that those 
rules are modified by UAPA); U.C.A. § 63-46b-7 (providing that the 
rules of discovery under the U.R.C.P. apply if the agency has not 
enacted rules for discovery); U.C.A. § 63-46b-ll(3) (providing that 
a defaulted party may file a motion to set aside a default order 
under the procedures outlined in the U.R.C.P.); U.C.A. § 63-46b-
15(2) (providing that a petition for judicial review of informal 
adjudicative proceedings shall be a complaint governed by the 
U.R.C.P. and that all other pleadings and proceedings in the 
district court are governed by the U.R.C.P.); U.C.A. § 63-46b-
19(1)(c) (providing that the venue for proceedings to enforce 
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agency orders is governed by the requirements of the U.R.C.P.). 
Therefore, under Pilcher, it is clear that under UAPA, only 
those sections of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure expressly 
adopted by UAPA or the agency, or those which expressly state they 
are intended to apply under UAPA, apply to administrative 
proceedings in Utah. 
II. CLARIFICATION OF THE PHRASE 
"WITHOUT PREJUDICE" IN THE COMMISSIONS ORDER. 
The respondent notes that the order issued by the ALJ on March 
11, 1993 was issued "without prejudice." The use of the term 
"without prejudice" indicates that the dismissal was not based on 
the merits of the underlying case. We believe that we erred in 
simply affirming the ALJ's dismissal and that we should have 
dismissed the matter outright based upon our own review of the 
matter for lack of jurisdiction. 
ORDER: 
IT IS ORDERED that the RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR REVIEW AND 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the District 
Court of the State of Utah within 3 0 days of the date of the order, 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-46b-15, Alumbaugh 
v. White, 800 P.2d 825 (Utah App. 1990), and Couriers v. Dep't of 
Empl. Sec, et al., 201 Utah Adv. Rep.^7^ (CA, 12/4/92). 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
<W^T\ 
C e r t i f i e d t h i s / ^ day of 
AT3 
Colleen S. Coltbn 
Commissioner 
s/P?^>^ 
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